On May, 9, 2025, the Texas Supreme Court handed down several opinions, many of which involve areas of Lydecker’s practice in Texas. Accordingly, a brief summary follows of some of the more significant holdings by the Texas Supreme Court today.
Michael A. Pohl, et al. v. Mark Cheatham, Sr., et al. – This case involved a little known, but critical statute, Section 82.0651(a) of the Texas Government Code, which allows clients to void a contract for legal services that was procured through conduct involving Barratry (a crime in Texas) or through violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. The Court held that the statute, however, does not extend past the Texas Boarder. Therefore, two lawyers from Houston, could not be held liable under the statute, for conduct that took place in Louisiana and Arkansas wherein they were alleged to use a “marketing company” to encourage potential clients to sign contingency fee agreements with the Houston based lawyers. However, the Court left open the issue of whether the plaintiff could maintain a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the lawyers for their actions.
Roxo Energy Company, LLC, et al. v. Baxsto, LLC – The Texas Supreme Court, to no surprise to anyone, held that alleged oral representations that are inconsistent with the parties’ written contracts do not supersede the written agreement. Instead, the written agreement between the parties. “When assessing red flags, we view ‘the circumstances in their entirety while accounting for the parties’ relative levels of sophistication.’ … Baxsto’s representative, Cole Stout, was an experienced oil and gas businessman who should have appreciated the significance of the disparities between the signed agreement and the alleged oral promises now claimed.” Bottom line – Get it in writing!
Sadok Ferchichi, et al. v. Whataburger Restaurants LLC, et al. & Haven at Thorpe Lane, LLC v. Jerretta Pate, et al. (consolidated cases) – Here, the Texas Supreme Court had to deal with some legal shenanigans by some creative defense lawyers. Both had withheld evidence which forced the plaintiffs to file motions to compel and motions for sanctions. They then used the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”), which provides a mechanism for dismissal of a “legal action” that is based on or in response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, petition, or association, to seek dismissal of the motion to compel and motion for sanctions. The trial court rejected the argument, but two different courts of appeals reversed, holding that motions to compel and motion for sanctions fall under the definition of a “legal action.” The Texas Supreme Court was not amused. It noted that the TCPA has a dual purpose: “to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government” and to “protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” A “Legal Action” under the definitions of the TCPA, excludes “a procedural action taken or motion made in an action that does not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief.” The Texas Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of ejusdem generis to limit the catch all in the broad term of a “Legal Action” to not include procedural motions such as motions to compel discovery and motions for sanctions.
Chad Seward, et al. v. Santander Sr., et. al. – In Texas, often police officers will work for security guard companies to provide security at retail establishments, in this case, Home Depot. In this case, the off-duty officer, working as a security guard, detained a suspected shoplifter and called the police. The shoplifter had an outstanding arrest warrant and so when two on-duty officers showed up, there was a struggle and the shoplifter shot and killed one of the officers. Suit was brought against the security company, Home Depot, and the off-duty police officer (working as a security guard). The Texas Supreme Court was faced with two legal issues: (1) whether the security guard’s conduct leading up to the shooting was within the scope of his employment as a police officer, entitling him to dismissal of the suit against him under the Tort Claims Act; and (2) whether Texas should adopt the common-law rule that limits the duties owed to responding public-safety officers. The Texas Supreme Court answered yes to both. It held that when a police officer has reasonable suspicion “that a person in his presence is about to commit or is in the process of committing theft, as here, he has a statutory duty to interfere to prevent the crime, even when off duty and in private employment.” Second, the Court held, “consistent with public policy, we join a majority of jurisdictions in adopting the public-safety officer’s rule, which restricts the duties owed to officers who are injured by the alleged negligence that necessitated their response.”
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Christopher Chapaneri a distinguished Lydecker attorney with extensive expertise in civil litigation, construction defect, premises liability, amusement park litigation, commercial motor vehicle/trucking, employment law, and environmental litigation—including mold exposure and vegetation management/overspray matters. Chapaneri also has a robust appellate practice, having successfully handled cases before the Texas Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In addition, Chapaneri brings substantial experience in handling high exposure and high-risk cases, further strengthening Lydecker’s ability to serve clients across multiple industries in Texas and beyond. Chapaneri also provides services in the State of Oklahoma.
